二、报告人及文章摘要（Speaker and abstract）

1. 杨翼（Prof. Yi Yang）

报告人简介（Bio）：杨翼，浙江大学管理学院教授，博士生导师，数据驱动决策研究所所长，国家自然科学基金优秀青年科学基金获得者，教育部青年长江学者。2011年毕业于香港中文大学系统工程与工程管理学系。主要研究方向包括库存管理、收益管理以及运营管理。在高水平国际期刊上发表论文十余篇，特别是在Operations Research, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, Production and Operations Management等UT/Dallas24种经济管理类国际公认顶级期刊上发表学术论文多篇。承担多项国家及省部级课题，现担任中国运筹学会的英文期刊JORSC (Journal of the Operations Research Society of China)的Associate Editor、运筹学会随机服务与运作管理分会理事、系统工程学会物流系统工程专业委员会理事、运筹学会智能工业数据解析与优化分会理事等工作。

文章题目（Title）：Managing Perishable Inventory Systems with Multiple Age-differentiated Demand Classes

文章摘要（Abstract）： In this paper, we consider a periodic-review inventory system with perishable products. In the market, there are different demand classes; each can be characterized by its different lost-sale cost and freshness requirement. By establishing some new properties of multimodularity, we partially characterize the structure of the optimal policy. Based on the optimality analysis, we design several efficient approximation approaches. Numerical studies show that our heuristic policy outperforms the traditional heuristics proposed by prior literature.

2. 关旭（Prof. Xu Guan）

报告人简介（Bio）：关旭，www.365808.com管理科学与工程系教授; 华中科技大学管理学博士。目前研究兴趣包括信息不对称环境下的供应链管理。近5年来在Production and Operations Management, Naval Research Logistic等国际权威学术发表近20篇论文。

文章题目（Title）：Strategic Inventory and Price Signaling with Demand Information Asymmetry   

文章摘要（Abstract）：In a two-period supply chain wherein the supplier dynamically determines the wholesale prices, a retailer can strategically hold inventory to alleviate double marginalization and create a ”win-win” situation for both firms. This strategic use of inventory has been verified by many studies but with a premise that the demand information is observable to both the supplier and the retailer. However, in practice, the retailer is normally less clear about the market potential than the supplier, particularly during a new product introduction process. This paper revisits the implications of strategic inventory in a context where the supplier privately observes the demand information and can use the wholesale price as a signaling tool to convey such information to the retailer.

We show that, first, the retailer might deliberately hold inventory even under commitment contract; in addition, the retailer’s incentive to carry strategic inventory exhibits a non-monotonic relationship between the inventory level and the demand potential under dynamic contract. Second, the supplier’s payoff could decrease with the inventory cost under commitment contract while increase with the inventory cost under dynamic contract, even though there is no inventory existing under either contract scheme. Third, the supplier no longer unambiguously prefers dynamic contract to commitment contract once the inventory cost is low. In contrast, the retailer can obtain a higher payoff under dynamic contract (commitment contract) once the inventory cost is high (low). All these results are in strict contract with the existing literature and highlight the pivotal role of price signaling in the strategic use of inventory.  

3. 薛巍立（Prof. Weili Xue）

报告人简介（Bio）：薛巍立，东南大学经济管理学院副教授，硕士生、博士生导师。博士毕业于香港中文大学系统工程与工程管理系，主要从事供应链物流管理、运营风险管理和医疗服务运作管理等。发表SCI/SSCI等期刊论文20篇以上，主要成果发表在Operations Research、Production and Operations Management、European Journal of Operational Research、Operations Research Letters等期刊上。

文章题目（Title）：Value of Category Captainship with Shelf Space Dependent Demand  

文章摘要（Abstract）：This paper studies the value of category captainship with shelf-space- dependent demands in retail supply chains. We consider a model where two competing manufacturers selling their substitutable products through a common retailer who determines the total shelf space allocated to the focal category. Two category management mechanisms are considered: retailer category management (RCM) and caption category management (CCM). For each scenario, we derive the optimal total category shelf space, wholesale prices and shelf space allocated to each product. And then we investigate when the category captainship benefits the retailer and the caption manufacturer. We also extend our analysis to the case with endogenously determined profit sharing ratio by a sequential bargaining game and the case with shelf-space-and-price-dependent demands. We find that the retailer always benefits from those products with high direct elasticity of shelf space, however its effect on the manufacturer's profit under RCM may be vague. For the case of CCM, a larger shelf space elasticity benefits the caption manufacturer, however, it may hurt the non-caption manufacturer. Moreover, a larger profit sharing ratio may not benefit the caption manufacturer. The results indicate that the retailer and the caption manufacturer benefits from CCM only when the profit sharing ratio falls in an interval which implies that the retailer should be careful when adopting category captainship.

4. 徐小林（Prof. Xiaolin Xu）

报告人简介（Bio）：徐小林，南京大学商学院教授、博士生导师，案例中心主任。南京大学数学学士（1999）、经济学硕士（2002），香港中文大学系统工程博士（2006）。曾任职香港中文大学博士后研究员，澳大利亚新南威尔士大学任兼职研究员。国家自然科学基金和香港RGC通讯评议专家、中国管理现代化研究会管理案例研究专业委员会副秘书长、中国自动化学会经济与管理系统分会委员。在Production and Operations Management等期刊发表论文多篇，并担任Operations Research等国际期刊的审稿人。主持国家自然科学基金面上项目三项。

文章题目（Title）： An Inventory Perspective for Omnichannel Design

文章摘要（Abstract）：  Many traditional retailers and etailers such as Walmart and Amazon have been implementing omnichannel strategies, such as buy-online pickup-at-store (BOPS), buy-online ship-to-store (BOSS) and buy-online ship-from-store (BOFS).  We build a stylized model to investigate the impact of these omnichannel strategies on store operations from the inventory perspective. For BOPS, we find that it may benefit or hurt the retailer depending on his two key capabilities: the brick-and-mortar (B&M) store density and the online delivery efficiency. For a retailer with a relatively low density of B&M stores and a high delivery efficiency, BOPS induces certain customers to migrate from the online channel to BOPS, leading to a demand pooling} at the B&M store. It generates two benefits for the retailer: 1) it can reduce the overage risk or the shortage risk of local inventory (risk hedging effect); and 2) it results in a higher fill rate at the B&M store (availability improvement effect), which benefits the existing customers and attracts more additional customers to visit the B\&M store. On the contrary, for a retailer with a modest density of B&M stores and a low delivery efficiency, BOPS may hurt the retailer and customers due to a demand depooling effect as (a portion of) customers who originally shop offline are likely to switch to BOPS. It may reduce the fill rate at the B&M store, driving out of customers who previously remained stubbornly in-store and forcing those who originally prefer the offline channel to purchase online. Compared with BOPS, BOSS aggravates the depooling effect while BOFS augments the pooling effect.

5. 马利军（Prof. Lijun Ma）

报告人简介（Bio）：Dr. Lijun Ma is currently Professor of Operations Management and the Associate Department Head of Department of Management Science in the College of Management at Shenzhen University. He received his B.S. and M.S. degrees from the University of Science and Technology of China and his Ph.D. degree in Systems Engineering and Engineering Management from the Chinese University of Hong Kong in 2007. He has published over 100 journal articles, conference papers and book chapters on inventory management, supply chain management, and transportation management. His publications appear in many international journals such as EJOR, AOR, OR Letters, TRE, IJPE, IJPR and JORS. He also consulted for manufacturing and logistics companies such as SF Express on issues spanning from business process re-engineering to supply chain management. He is a member of INFORMS, POMS and ORSC. He is currently working on several research projects funded by a range of funding bodies including the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC).

文章题目（Title）：Empty Container Management and Coordination in Intermodal Transport

文章摘要（Abstract）：In this paper, we study the empty container inventory sharing and coordination problem in intermodal transport. We focus on dry ports in intermodal transport to raise the coordination issue in empty container management. We consider an intermodal transport system composed of one railway transport firm at a dry port and one liner firm at a seaport. First, we characterize the optimal delivery policy between the dry port and seaport in the centralized model. We investigate how the optimal policy changes with the initial inventories of empty containers at the dry port and seaport. Next, we design a bilateral buy- back contract to coordinate the decentralized system. We derive the Nash equilibrium of the inventory sharing game between the rail firm and liner firm under the decentralized model as well as the equilibrium delivery quantity with a given bilateral buy-back contract. Moreover, we coordinate the decentralized system by choosing appropriate contract parameters and show how the system’s profit can be distributed between the two firms under coordination.  

6. 张莲民（Prof. Lianmin Zhang）

报告人简介（Bio）：张莲民，南京大学工程管理学院讲师。2013年于香港中文大学系统工程与工程管理系取得工学博士学位。主要从事运营管理方面的教学科研研究。在Production and Operations Research等国际期刊发表论文多篇，参加国际/国内学术会议多次。作为负责人主持国家自然科学基金项目和江苏省高校自然科学基金。

文章题目（Title）：Cost Sharing for Capacity Transfer in Cooperating Queueing Systems

文章摘要（Abstract）：We study the problem where independent operators of queueing systems cooperate to generate a win–win solution through capacity transfer among each other. We consider two types of costs: the congestion cost in the queueing system and the capacity transfer cost, and two types of queueing systems: M/M/1 and M/M/s. Service rates are consid- ered to be capacities in M/M/1 and are assumed to be continuous, while numbers of servers are capacities in M/M/s. For the capacity transfer problem in M/M/1, we formulate it as a convex optimization problem and identify a cost-sharing scheme which belongs to the core of the corresponding cooperative game. For the capacity transfer problem in M/M/s, we formulate it as a nonlinear integer optimization problem, which we refer to as the server transfer problem. We first develop a marginal analysis algorithm to solve this problem when the unit transfer costs are equal among agents, and then propose a cost-sharing rule which is shown to be in the core of the corresponding game. Finally, we conduct numerical studies to evaluate the performance of the proposed greedy heuristic and the proposed cost allocation rules, and examine the value of capacity transfer。  

7. 李建斌（Prof. Jianbin Li）

报告人简介（Bio）：李建斌，武汉大学教授/博导，美国宾夕法尼亚大学Wharton商学院访问学者。香港科技大学／香港中文大学博士后。于2010年入选湖北省楚天学者，2011年入选华中科技大学学术新人奖；2012年入选华中科技大学华中学者，2013年入选教育部新世纪优秀人才计划，2014年获华中科技大学“青年五四”奖章。主要研究领域为物流与供应链管理、电子商务及医药供应链管理。目前在国际一流期刊POMS、DS、NRL、EJOR、IJPE、IJPR、APJOR、JIMNO等期刊及国内管理科学学报、中国管理科学、系统工程理论与实践等权威期刊发表过50多篇文章。曾获华人学者管理科学实践奖第二名；中国物流学会优秀论文一等奖及青年新锐奖；第八届服务系统与服务管理国际学术会议最佳论文奖；获第十一届中国管理科学年会优秀论文奖；2014年第九届中国管理学年会最佳论文奖；华中科技大学学术新人奖；湖北省/华中科技大学大学生实习优秀团队指导教师。主持／完成5项国家自然科学基金项目，已结题自科青年基金项目后评估为特优。

文章题目（Title）：Optimal Pricing Strategies with a Name-Your-Own-Price Recycle Channel and Remanufacturing

文章摘要（Abstract）：We study pricing and production strategies for an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) under a remanufacturing environment. The returns are collected under a name-your-own-price (NYOP) mechanism. OEM has two options to collect returns:  Model M where the OEM undertakes recycling and Model T where the third party (TP) undertakes recycling. We first derive optimal decisions for each model and find that the optimal strategies are dependent on operational cost of recycling unit return. We make a comparison between Model M and Model T and obtain the conditions under which Model T is better than Model M in terms of agents' profit, retail price and environmental impact. We also compare the performance of NYOP mechanism and list-price mechanism. In addition, we find that an additional bidding option makes the manufacturer less likely to outsource recycling business.

8. 杨超林（Prof. Chaolin Yang）

报告人简介（Bio）：杨超林，上海财经大学信息管理与工程学院副教授，博士生导师。2015年于香港中文大学系统工程与工程管理系获得博士学位。主要研究兴趣包括供应链管理、随机库存控制、基于数据的运营管理、广告竞争。他的论文发表在了运营管理国际顶级期刊Management Science和Operations Research上。杨博士为国内多家大型零售、物流和制造企业（包括京东、顺丰科技和华域视觉科技等）提供库存管理咨询服务。

文章题目（Title）： Multilocation Newsvendor Problem: Centralization and Inventory Pooling

文章摘要（Abstract）：We study a multilocation newsvendor model with a retailer owning multiple retailing stores, each of which is managed by a manager who decides its order quantity for filling random customer demand of a product. The store managers and the retailer are all risk-averse while the managers are more risk-averse than the retailer. We adopt conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) as the performance measure and consider two alternative strategies to improve the performance of the system. First, the retailer centralizes the ordering decisions. Second, the managers still decide the order quantity for their own store whereas their inventories are pooled together. We compare the optimal order quantities and the resulting CVaR values of the systems and study their comparative statistics. We find that when there is no inventory pooling, each store has a higher inventory level in the centralized system than in the decentralized system. More interestingly, centralization brings positive benefits to the retailer as long as some store manager(s) is strictly more risk-averse than the retailer. When there is inventory pooling, if the store managers are sufficiently more risk-averse than the retailer or the demands are very heavy-tailed, we find that inventory pooling brings less benefit than centralization. In our numerical study, we first employ data from an online retailer in China to validate our analytical results. Then we use simulated data to further show that both the benefit of centralization and the benefit of inventory pooling increase as the product price, the number of stores, or the demand variance increases; for positively correlated demands, it is more likely that centralization brings more benefit than inventory pooling; and centralization and inventory pooling could be either strategic complements or substitutes. This is joint work with Zhenyu Hu (NUS) and Sean X. Zhou (CUHK).

 9. 刘彦初（Prof. Yanchu Liu）

报告人简介（Bio）：刘彦初，男，四川眉山人。现就职于中山大学岭南（大学）学院，担任金融学副教授，（应用经济学）硕士生导师。香港中文大学金融工程学博士，中国科学技术大学理学硕士与理学学士。持有金融风险管理师（Financial Risk Manager）证书。主要研究兴趣为金融工程，金融科技，金融计量经济学，以及相关应用。在《管理科学学报》，Operations Research，Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control，European Journal of Operational Research，Journal of Futures Markets，Energy Policy，Finance Research Letters，Journal of Management Science and Engineering等国内外主流学术期刊上发表论文十余篇。目前主持国家自然科学基金青年项目，以及中央高校基本科研业务费项目等科研基金。相关研究曾获得2017年第九届中国决策科学学术年会优秀论文奖，第十四届金融系统工程与工程管理国际年会(FSERM2016)优秀论文奖，岭南学院董事会“杰出科研贡献奖”等奖项。

文章题目（Title）：Textual Sentiment, Option Implied Information and Equity Return Predictability

文章摘要（Abstract）：A growing literature shows a predictability of stock returns based on sentiment proxies. More recently, it has been shown that also variables implied from single stock options markets carry predictive content for future equity returns. Where does this predictability stem from? Is it firm-specific information advantage or is it a firm-specific sentiment that is implemented in terms of option-based strategies and thus leads to return predictability? In this work, we aim at answering this question. We distill sentiment from a huge bulk of NASDAQ news articles and examine the various sources of predictive power. We find that options markets react to sentiment from NASDAQ articles in that higher implied volatility, higher out-of-money put prices and stronger smirk can be observed as more negative articles being posted which constitutes more negative sentiment. Next we inspect return predictability. We find that options variables indeed predict stock returns, yet sentiment variables, in particular, our index sentiment remains a highly relevant factor for individual stock returns. Firm specific-sentiment becomes weaker after controlling for information implied in options. The strength of predictions appears to subside from high to low attention firms, but still remains for low-attention firms. We conclude that the predictability of options markets cannot exclusively be attributed to information asymmetry but also to sentiment. We also construct residual-based trading strategies which yield remarkable annualized excess returns with very high Sharpe ratios. [This is a joint work with Cathy Chen (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany), Matthias Fengler (University of St.Gallen, Switzerland) and Wolfgang Hardle (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany).]

10. Yiwei Chen （Prof. Yiwei Chen）

报告人简介（Bio）：Dr. Yiwei Chen is an Assistant Professor at Singapore University of Technology and Design, Pillar of Engineering Systems and Design. He will be joining the University of Cincinnati, College of Business as an Assistant Professor in August 2018. Dr. Chen received his Ph.D. from MIT Sloan School of Management. His primary research interests are revenue management and pricing, and sharing economy and innovative marketplaces.

文章题目（Title）：On the Efficacy of Static Prices for Revenue Management in the Face of Strategic Customers

文章摘要（Abstract）：The present paper considers a canonical revenue management problem wherein a monopolist seller seeks to maximize revenues from selling a fixed inventory of a product to customers who arrive over time. We assume that customers are forward looking and strategize on the timing of their purchase, an empirically confirmed aspect of modern customer behavior. In the event that customers were myopic, foundational work by Gallego and Van Ryzin [1994] established that static prices are asymptotically optimal for this problem. In stark contrast, for the case where customers are forward looking, available results in mechanism design and dynamic pricing suggest a substantially more complicated prescription, and are often constrained by restrictive assumptions on customer type. 

The present paper studies this revenue management problem while assuming that customers are forward looking and strategic. We demonstrate that for a broad class of customer utility models, static prices surprisingly continue to remain asymptotically optimal in the regime where inventory and demand grow large. We further show that irrespective of regime, an optimally set static price guarantees the seller revenues that are within at least 63.2% of that under an optimal dynamic mechanism. The class of customer utility models we consider is parsimonious and enjoys empirical support. It subsumes many of the utility models considered for this problem in existing mechanism design research; we allow for multi-dimensional customer types. We also allow for a customer’s disutility from waiting to be positively correlated with his valuation. Our conclusions are thus robust and provide a simple prescription for a canonical RM problem that is near-optimal across a broad set of modeling assumptions. 

11. 胡鹏（Prof. Peng Hu）

报告人简介（Bio）：胡鹏，华中科技大学管理学院生产运作与物流管理系教授。研究方向包括库存管理、优化算法设计、收益管理等。近年来专注于动态规划方法在运筹学和运营管理领域的应用，在Management Science和Operations Research等期刊上发表多篇论文，并于2016年获得国家自然科学基金优秀青年项目的资助。

文章题目（Title）：Dynamic Inventory Management With General Replenishment Cost: The Lost Sales Case

文章摘要（Abstract）：Stochastic periodic-review inventory systems with different types of replenishment cost functions have been studied for decades since the seminal work by Scarf, where the focus is to characterize the optimal replenishment policy. It is not surprising that a more general cost structure usually makes the optimal policy more complicated. Our work follows this stream and studies the classic model under the lost sales setting, where the replenishment cost could be arbitrary. Surprisingly, by only assuming demands are independent and follow log-concave densities, as well as some mild conditions on the inventory-related cost functions, we manage to completely characterize the optimal policy, e.g., a replenishment should be executed if and only if the initially inventory level of a period falls below some threshold.

12. Xin Chen（Prof. Xin Chen）

报告人简介（Bio）：Xin Chen is a professor, an Abel Bliss Faculty Scholar and the Jerry S. Dobrovolny Faculty Scholar at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He obtained his PhD from MIT in 2003, MS from Chinese Academy of Sciences in 1998 and BS from Xiangtan University in 1995. His research interest lies in optimization, data analytics, revenue management and supply chain management. He received the Informs revenue management and pricing section prize in 2009. He is the coauthor of the book “The Logic of Logistics: Theory, Algorithms, and Applications for Logistics and Supply Chain Management (Second Edition, 2005, & Third Edition, 2014)”, and serving as an associate editor of several journals including Operations Research, Management Science, Mathematics of Operation Research and Production and Operations Management.

文章题目（Title）：Dynamic pricing and inventory control with large replenishment lead times

文章摘要（Abstract）：We consider a joint pricing and inventory control problem with positive replenishment lead times. Although this problem has been extensively studied in the literature, the structure of the optimal policy remains poorly understood. In this work, we propose a class of so-called constant-order list-price policies. We prove that the best constant-order list-price policy is indeed asymptotically optimal as the lead time grows large, which is exactly the setting in which the problem becomes computationally intractable due to the curse of dimensionality.